Ye [2011] showed recently that the simplex method with Dantzig's pivoting rule, as well as Howard's policy iteration algorithm, solve discounted Markov decision processes (MDPs), with a constant discount factor, in strongly polynomial time. More precisely, Ye showed that both algorithms terminate after at most O mn 1−γ log n 1−γ iterations, where n is the number of states, m is the total number of actions in the MDP, and 0 < γ < 1 is the discount factor. We improve Ye's analysis in two respects. First, we improve the bound given by Ye and show that Howard's policy iteration algorithm actually terminates after at most O m 1−γ log n 1−γ iterations. Second, and more importantly, we show that the same bound applies to the number of iterations performed by the strategy iteration (or strategy improvement) algorithm, a generalization of Howard's policy iteration algorithm used for solving 2-player turn-based stochastic games with discounted zero-sum rewards. This provides the first strongly polynomial algorithm for solving these games, solving a long standing open problem. Combined with other recent results, this provides a complete characterization of the complexity the standard strategy iteration algorithm for 2-player turn-based stochastic games; it is strongly polynomial for a fixed discount factor, and exponential otherwise.
INTRODUCTION
Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) are widely used in operations research, machine learning and related disciplines, to model long-term sequential decision making in uncertain, that is, stochastic, environments. Stochastic Games (SGs), a generalization of MDPs to a 2-player setting, are widely used to model long-term sequential decision making in stochastic and adversarial environments. MDPs were first introduced by Bellman [1957] . SGs, which form a more general model, were introduced slightly earlier by Shapley [1953] . Many variants of MDPs and SGs were studied in the literature. The MDPs and SGs considered in this article are infinite-horizon discounted MDPs/SGs. The SGs we consider are turn-based and we thus refer to them as 2-player .
MDPs may be viewed as degenerate 2TBSGs in which one of the players has no influence on the game. For a thorough treatment of MDPs and their numerous practical applications, see Howard [1960] , Derman [1972] , Puterman [1994] , and Bertsekas [2001] . For a similar treatment of SGs, see Filar and Vrieze [1996] and Neyman and Sorin [2003] .
A 2TBSGs is composed of a finite set of states and a finite set of actions. Each state is controlled by one of the players. In each time unit, the game is in exactly one of the states. Each state has a nonempty set of actions associated with it. The player controlling the state must choose one of these actions. Playing an action incurs an immediate cost, and results in a probabilistic transition to a new state according to a probability distribution that depends on the action. The process goes on indefinitely. The first player tries to minimize the total expected discounted cost of the infinite sequence of actions taken, with respect to a fixed discount factor. The second player tries to maximize this total discounted cost. Discounting captures the fact that a cost incurred at a later stage has a smaller effect than the same cost incurred at an earlier stage. For formal definitions, see Section 2.
A policy or a strategy for a player is a possibly probabilistic rule that specifies the action to be taken in each situation, given the full history of play so far. One of the fundamental results in the theory of MDPs and 2TBSGs, is that both players have positional optimal strategies. A positional strategy is a strategy that is both deterministic and memoryless. A memoryless strategy is a strategy that depends only on the current state, and not on the full history. MDPs and 2TBSGs are solved by finding optimal positional strategies for the players.
MDPs can be solved using linear programming ([d'Epenoux 1963; Derman 1972] ). The preferred way of solving MDPs in practice, however, is Howard's [1960] Policy Iteration algorithm. The policy iteration algorithm maintains and iteratively improves a policy by performing "obvious" improving switches (for details, see Section 6). Howard's algorithm may be viewed as a parallel version of the simplex algorithm in which several pivoting steps are performed simultaneously. The problem of determining the worst-case complexity of Howard's algorithm was stated explicitly at least 25 years ago. (It is mentioned, among other places, in Schmitz [1985] , Littman et al. [1995] and Mansour and Singh [1999] .) Meister and Holzbaur [1986] established, decades ago, that the number of iterations performed by Howard's algorithm, when the discount factor is fixed, is polynomially bounded in the bit size of the input. Their bound, however, is not strongly polynomial, as it does not depend solely on the number of states and actions of the MDP. The first strongly polynomial time algorithm for solving MDPs with a fixed discount factor was an interior point algorithm of Ye [2005] .
Very recently, Ye [2011] presented a surprisingly simple proof that Howard's algorithm terminates after at most O mn 1−γ log n 1−γ iterations, where n is the number of states, m is the total number of actions, and 0 < γ < 1 is the discount factor. In particular, when the discount factor is constant, the number of iterations is O(mn log n). Since each iteration only involves solving a system of linear equations, Ye's result established for the first time that Howard's algorithm is a strongly polynomial-time algorithm, when the discount factor is constant. Ye's proof is based on a careful analysis of an LP formulation of the MDP problem, with LP duality and complementary slackness playing crucial roles.
We significantly improve and extend Ye's [2011] analysis. We show that Howard's algorithm actually terminates after at most O m 1−γ log n 1−γ iterations, improving Ye's bound by a factor of n. Interestingly, the only added ingredient needed to obtain this significant improvement is a well-known relationship between Howard's Policy Iteration algorithm and Bellman's [1957] Value Iteration algorithm, an algorithm for approximating the values of MDPs.
More significantly, and more surprisingly, we are able to obtain the same O m 1−γ log n 1−γ bound also for the Strategy Iteration (or Strategy Improvement) algorithm for the solution of 2TBSGs. This supplies the first strongly polynomial algorithm for solving 2TBSGs, with a fixed discount factor, solving a long standing open problem.
The strategy iteration algorithm is a natural generalization of Howard's policy iteration algorithm that can be used to solve 2TBSGs. The strategy iteration algorithm for discounted 2-player games was apparently first described by Rao et al. [1973] . Hoffman and Karp [1966] earlier described a related algorithm for a somewhat different class of SGs.
Prior to our strongly polynomial bound for the strategy iteration algorithm, the best time available on the problem of solving discounted 2TBSGs was a polynomial, but not strongly polynomial, bound of Littman [1996] , obtained essentially using value iteration. The best time bound expressed solely in terms of the number states and actions was a subexponential bound of Ludwig [1995] . (See also Vorobyov [2005, 2007] and Halman [2007] .) Interestingly, these subexponential bounds are obtained using randomized variants of the strategy iteration algorithm that mimic the combinatorial subexponential algorithms of Kalai [1992 Kalai [ , 1997 and Matoušek et al. [1996] for solving LP-type problems.
What makes our analysis of the strategy iteration algorithm surprising is the fact that Ye's analysis relies heavily on the LP formulation of MDPs. In contrast, no succinct LP formulation is known for 2TBSGs. (Natural attempts fail. See Condon [1993] .) Our proof is based on finding natural game-theoretic quantities that correspond to the LP-based quantities used by Ye, and by reestablishing, via direct means, (improved versions of) the bounds obtained by Ye using LP duality. Ye's [2011] results and our results, combined with the recent results of Friedmann [2011] and Fearnley [2010] , supply a complete characterization of the complexity of the standard policy/strategy iteration algorithm for MDPs/2TBSGs. The policy/strategy iteration algorithms are strongly polynomial for a fixed discount factor, but exponential for nondiscounted problems, or when the discount factor is part of the input. (In nondiscounted problems, the discounting criteria is replaced by limiting average criteria. In a sense, this is equivalent to letting the discount factor tend to 1. See, for example, Derman [1972] .) The strong polynomiality of the policy/strategy iteration algorithms when the discount factor is fixed may be attributed to the fact that the value iteration operator (see Section 5), which is closely related to the algorithms, is a contraction with the discount factor being its Lipschitz constant.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the 2-player turn-based stochastic games (2TBSG) studied in this article. In Sections 3-6, we summarize known results regarding these games. For completeness, these sections contain concise, but complete, proofs of all results. (The proofs in these three sections are not the innovative part of this article and may be skipped at first reading.) Finally, in Section 7 we obtain our new strongly polynomial bound on the complexity of the celebrated strategy iteration algorithm, solving a long-standing open problem. We end in Section 8 with some concluding remarks and open problems.
2-PLAYER TURN-BASED STOCHASTIC GAMES
Discounted stochastic games were first studied by Shapley [1953] . In his games, the players perform simultaneous, or concurrent, actions. We consider the subclass of turnbased stochastic games.
Before giving the formal definition of 2-Player Turn-Based Stochastic Games (2TB-SGs), we briefly review this informal definition. A game is composed of states and actions. It starts at some initial state and proceeds, in discrete steps, indefinitely. In each time step one of the players plays an action. (The game is thus a turn-based or perfect information game.) Each action has a cost associated with it. This is the cost paid by player 1 to player 2 when this action is played. (The game is therefore a zerosum game.) Each action also has a probability distribution on states associated with it. The next state, after playing a particular action, is chosen randomly according to this probability distribution. (The game is, in general, stochastic.) Finally, the game is discounted. The first player tries to minimize the expected total discounted cost, while the second player tries to maximize it. A, s, p, c, γ ) , where S 1 and S 2 are the set of states controlled by players 1 and 2, respectively, A is a set of actions, s : A → S 1 ∪ S 2 is a function that assigns to each action the state from which it can be applied, p : A → (S 1 ∪ S 2 ) is a function that assigns to each action a probability distribution over states according to which the next state is chosen if the action is played, c : A → R is a function that assigns to each action a real cost, and finally 0 < γ < 1 is a fixed discount factor. We assume that S 1 ∩ S 2 = ∅ and let S = S 1 ∪ S 2 . For every i ∈ S, we let A i = {a ∈ A | s(a) = i} be the set of actions that can be played from i. We assume that A i = ∅, for every i ∈ S. We let A 1 = ∪ i∈S 1 A i and A 2 = ∪ i∈S 2 A i be the sets of all actions that can be played by players 1 and 2, respectively. If the infinite sequence of actions taken by the two players is a 0 , a 1 , . . ., then the total discounted cost of this action sequence is k≥0 γ k c(a k ).
There are two ways of interpreting the discount factor γ . The discount factor may be viewed as the inverse of the rate of inflation. Thus, a cost of c(a) of action a at time k corresponds to a cost of γ k c(a) at time 0. Alternatively, 1 − γ may be viewed as the probability that the game stops after each step. The expected cost of an action a at time k is then again γ k c(a), as γ k is the probability that the game reaches time k.
If one of the players has only a single action available from each state under her control, the game degenerates into a 1-player game known as a Markov Decision Process. (This happens, in particular, when S 1 = ∅ or S 2 = ∅.)
We next define the probability and action matrices of 2TBSGs. These matrices provide a compact representation of 2TBSGs that greatly simplifies their manipulation. Throughout this article, we use n = |S| and m = |A| to denote the number of states and actions, respectively, in a game.
Definition 2.2 (Probability and Action Matrices). Let G = (S 1 , S 2 , A, s, p, c,γ ) be a 2TBSG. We assume, without loss of generality, that S = S 1 ∪ S 2 = [ n] = {1, . . . , n} and A = [ m] = {1, . . . , m}. We let P ∈ R m×n , where P a,i = p(a) i is the probability of ending up in state i after taking action a, for every a ∈ A = [ m] and i ∈ S = [ n], be the probability matrix of the game, and c ∈ R m , where c a = c(a) is the cost of action a ∈ A = [ m], be its cost vector. We also let J ∈ R m×n be a matrix such that J a,i = 1 if a ∈ A i , and 0 otherwise. Finally, we let Q = J − γ P be the action matrix of G.
It is interesting to note that a 2TBSG is fully specified by its action matrix Q = J − γ P, its cost vector c, and the partition of S = [ n] into S 1 and S 2 . (Action matrices may be thought of as a stochastic and discounted generalization of the incidence matrices of directed graphs.) Definition 2.3 (Strategies, Strategy Profiles). A (positional) strategy π j for player j, where j ∈ {1, 2}, is a mapping π j : S j → A such that π j (i) ∈ A i , for every i ∈ S j . We say that player j uses strategy π j if whenever the game is in state i, player j chooses action π j (i). A strategy profile π = (π 1 , π 2 ) is simply a pair of strategies for the two players. We let j = j (G), for j ∈ {1, 2}, be the set of all strategies of player j, and let = (G) = 1 × 2 be the set of all strategy profiles in G.
We note that a strategy profile π = (π 1 , π 2 ) may be viewed as a mapping π : S → A, that is, as a strategy in a 1-player version of the game. All strategies considered in this article are positional. When convenient, we identify a strategy π j with the set π j (S) ⊆ A j , and a strategy profile π with the set π(S) ⊆ A. A strategy profile π = (π 1 , π 2 ), when viewed as a subset of A, is simply the union π 1 ∪ π 2 . We let P π ∈ R n×n be the matrix obtained by selecting the rows of P whose indices belong to π . Note that P π is a (row) stochastic matrix; its elements are nonnegative and the elements in each row sum to 1. Thus P π defines a Markov chain. Similarly, c π ∈ R n is the vector containing the costs of the actions that belong to π . The pair P π , c π is thus a Markov chain with costs assigned to its states. We conveniently have J π = I and hence Q π = I − γ P π , for every strategy profile π .
Definition 2.4 (Value Vectors). For every strategy profile π = (π 1 , π 2 ) ∈ , we let v π = v π 1 ,π 2 ∈ R n be a vector such that (v π ) i , for every i ∈ S, is the expected total discounted cost when the game starts at state i, player 1 uses strategy π 1 , and player 2 uses strategy π 2 .
Given two vectors u, v ∈ R n , we say that u ≤ v if and only if u i ≤ v i , for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We say that u < v if and only if u ≤ v and u = v.
Definition 2.5 (Optimal Counter-Strategies). Let G be a 2TBSG and let π 2 ∈ 2 (G) be a strategy of player 2. A strategy π 1 for player 1 is said to be an optimal counterstrategy against π 2 , if and only if v π 1 ,π 2 ≤ v π 1 ,π 2 , for every π 1 ∈ 1 (G). Similarly, a strategy π 2 for player 2 is said to be an optimal counter-strategy against π 1 , if and only if v π 1 ,π 2 ≥ v π 1 ,π 2 , for every π 2 ∈ 2 (G). For every π 1 ∈ 1 (G), we let τ 2 (π 1 ) be an optimal counter strategy against π 1 , if one exists. For every π 2 ∈ 2 (G), we let τ 1 (π 2 ) be an optimal counter strategy against π 2 , if one exists.
It is not immediately clear that optimal counter-strategies always exist. (Note, that v π 1 ,π 2 ≤ v π 1 ,π 2 and v π 1 ,π 2 ≥ v π 1 ,π 2 are vector inequalities. As defined, optimal counterstrategies need to be optimal for every initial state.) Furthermore, optimal counterstrategies, if they exist, need not be unique. It is well known, however, that optimal counter-strategies do always exist, as we shall also show in Section 5.
In a two-player zero-sum game, an optimal strategy is by definition one that secures the best possible guarantee on the expected payoff against any opponent. As with finite games, pairs of optimal strategies in a zero-sum stochastic game coincide with the Nash equilibria of the game. This was established by Shapley [1953] . For brevity, we take this characterization to be the definition of an optimal strategy. Definition 2.6 (Optimal Strategies). A strategy profile π = (π 1 , π 2 ) ∈ (G) is said to be optimal if and only if π 1 is an optimal counter-strategy against π 2 , and π 2 is an optimal counter-strategy against π 1 . In such a case we also say that π 1 is an optimalstrategy for player 1 and that π 2 is an optimal strategy for player 2. Shapley [1953] also established the following theorem. THEOREM 2.7. Every 2TBSG has an optimal strategy profile. If π and π are two optimal strategy profiles then v π = v π .
Theorem 2.7 immediately implies the existence of optimal counter-strategies against any strategy. It is easy to see that π 1 is an optimal strategy for player 1 if and only if v π 1 ,τ 2 (π 1 ) ≤ v π 1 ,τ 2 (π 1 ) , for every π 1 ∈ 1 . An analogous condition clearly holds for player 2. The main result of this article is a proof that a pair of optimal strategies can be computed in strongly polynomial time, when the discount factor is constant.
BASIC RESULTS
For any strategy profile π , the matrix (I − γ P π ) plays a prominent role in the sequel. (Recall that P π is the matrix obtained by selecting the rows of P that correspond to actions of π .) We thus start with the following lemma whose trivial proof is omitted.
LEMMA 3.1. For any strategy profile π , the matrix (I − γ P π ) is invertible and
All entries of (I − γ P π ) −1 are nonnegative and the entries on the diagonal are strictly positive.
LEMMA 3.2. For every strategy profile π ∈ and every 0 < γ < 1, we have v π = (I − γ P π ) −1 c π .
PROOF. When the players use the strategy profile π , the process becomes a Markov chain with rewards with transition matrix P π . In particular, for every i, j ∈[ n] and every k ≥ 0, (P k π ) i,j is the probability that a game that starts at state i is in state j after exactly k steps. The expected total discounted costs, starting from all states are thus v π = k≥0 γ k P k π c π = (I − γ P π ) −1 c π .
Definition 3.3 (Reduced Costs). The reduced cost vectorc π ∈ R m corresponding to a strategy profile π is defined to bē
The reduced cost vectorc π is obtained from c via a potential transformation that uses v π as a vector of potentials. (If h : S → R is a function assigning potentials to the states, then the reduced cost c h (a) is defined as c h (a) = c(a)−h(s(a))+γ j∈S p(a) j h(j).)
It is important to stress the difference between c π ∈ R n , the vector obtained by selecting the entries of c ∈ R m corresponding to strategy profile π , and the reduced cost vectorc π = c − (J − γ P)v π ∈ R m of Definition 3.3.
We let 0 be an all zero vector. (The dimension of 0 will depend on the context.) Using Lemma 3.2, we immediately get the following basic but important relation.
LEMMA 3.4. For every strategy profile π , we have (c π ) π = 0.
In the next lemma, we show that the difference v π − v π between the value vectors of two strategy profiles π and π is equal to the value vector of π with respect to the reduced costsc π . LEMMA 3.5. For every two strategy profiles π , π we have v π − v π = (I − γ P π ) −1 (c π ) π . PROOF. By Definition 3.3 and Lemma 3.2, we have
Recall that A 1 = ∪ i∈S 1 A i and A 2 = ∪ i∈S 2 A i .
LEMMA 3.6. Let π = (π 1 , π 2 ) be a strategy profile. Then (i) π 1 is an optimal counter-strategy against π 2 if and only if (c π ) A 1 ≥ 0.
(ii) π 2 is an optimal counter-strategy against π 1 if and only if (c π ) A 2 ≤ 0.
PROOF. We prove (i). The proof of (ii) is analogous. Suppose that (c π ) A 1 ≥ 0. We prove that π 1 is an optimal counter-strategy against π 2 . For every π 1 ∈ 1 , we have (c π ) π 1 ≥ 0, as π 1 ⊆ A 1 . By Lemma 3.4, we have (c π ) π 2 = 0. Hence, (c π ) π 1 ,π 2 ≥ 0. By Lemma 3.1, all entries of (I − γ P π 1 ,π 2 ) −1 are nonnegative and, by Lemma 3.5, we thus have v π 1 ,π 2 − v π 1 ,π 2 = (I − γ P π 1 ,π 2 ) −1 (c π ) π 1 ,π 2 ≥ 0 .
Thus, v π 1 ,π 2 ≥ v π 1 ,π 2 , for every π 1 ∈ 1 , and π 1 is thus an optimal counter-strategy against π 2 . Suppose now that there is an action a ∈ A i 0 , where i 0 ∈ S 1 , such that (c π ) a < 0. Let π 1 ∈ 1 be a strategy such that π 1 (i) = π 1 (i), if i = i 0 , and π 1 (i 0 ) = a. We then have (c π ) π 1 < 0 and (c π ) π 2 = 0. Using Lemmas 3.1 and 3.5 again, we get that v π 1 ,π 2 − v π 1 ,π 2 = (I − γ P π 1 ,π 2 ) −1 (c π ) π 1 ,π 2 < 0 .
The strict inequality follows from the fact that all entries of (I − γ P π 1 ,π 2 ) −1 are nonnegative, with the diagonal entries being strictly positive. Thus, v π 1 ,π 2 < v π 1 ,π 2 and π 1 is not an optimal counter-strategy against π 2 .
In the second part of the proof of Lemma 3.6, π 1 is obtained from π 1 by an improving switch. Improving switches are closely related to the pivoting steps performed by the simplex algorithm. They also lie at the core of the strategy iteration algorithm whose analysis is the main focus of this article.
Recalling that strategy profile π = (π 1 , π 2 ) is optimal if and only if π 1 is an optimal counter-strategy against π 2 , and π 2 is an optimal counter-strategy against π 1 , we immediately have the following LEMMA 3.7 (OPTIMALITY CONDITION). A strategy profile π is optimal iff (c π ) A 1 ≥ 0 and (c π ) A 2 ≤ 0.
We let e = (1, 1, . . . , 1) T ∈ R n be an all one vector. We also let e i ∈ R n be the ith unit vector.
Definition 3.8 (Flux Vectors). For every strategy profile π , define x π ∈ R n as follows
It is not difficult to see that for every i ∈ S, we have (x π ) i = k≥0 e T (γ P π ) k e i . Using the interpretation of the 1 − γ as a stopping probability, we thus get that (x π ) i is the total expected number of times of passing through state i, when the players use the strategy profile π , and where each state is used, in turn, as the starting state. In a similar vein, we have: LEMMA 3.9. For every strategy profile π , we have e T x π = n 1 − γ .
PROOF. By Definition 3.8, Lemma 3.1, and the fact that e T (P T π ) k e = n, for every k ≥ 0, we have:
LEMMA 3.10. For every strategy profile π , we have
PROOF. By Lemma 3.2 and then Definition 3.8, we get
LEMMA 3.11. For every two strategy profiles π , π , we have e T (v π − v π ) = (c π ) T π x π . PROOF. By Lemma 3.5 and then Lemma 3.10, we have:
RELATION TO LP FORMULATIONS OF MDPS
In this section, we explain, for completeness, the relation between the results of the previous section and the known LP formulations of MDPs. We do not use results from this section in the rest of the article, where we talk about more general 2-player games for which no similar LP formulations are known. It is interesting to note, however, that 2TBSGs can be formulated as P-matrix linear complementarity problems as shown by Gärtner and Rüst [2005] and Jurdziński and Savani [2008] . Given an MDP with action matrix Q = J − γ P, we consider the following pair of primal and dual linear programs.
It is not difficult to see that the feasible bases of the primal correspond exactly to (pure) strategies of the MDP. For every strategy π , we obtain a basic feasible solution x π of the primal problem, and a basic solution v π of the dual problem. Actually, the flux vector of Definition 3.8 is (x π ) π , that is, the portion of x π that corresponds to the basic variables, that is, the actions used in π . Note that all other (nonbasic) entries in x π are 0. Note that x π is always feasible while v π is basic but usually not feasible. (In fact, v π is feasible if and only if π is optimal.) For every strategy (basis) π , the primal and dual values c T x π and e T v π are equal, which corresponds directly to Lemma 3.10.
Given a primal basic feasible solution x π , following the standard definition from the theory of linear programming, the vector of reduced costs corresponding to it is c = c − QQ −1 π c π . Noting that Q −1 π c π = v π , we get that this corresponds exactly to the definitionc π = c − Qv π given in the previous section. Recall that x π is an optimal solution of the LP if and only ifc ≥ 0, which corresponds to Lemma 3.7.
Finally, note that Lemma 3.11, when π and π are optimal such that the left-hand side is zero, resembles the complementary slackness condition. Indeed, the same calculations can be used to prove the complementary slackness condition for LPs. R m and B ⊆ [ m] , we let min B x = min j∈B x j , and similarly max B x = max j∈B x j . We also let argmin B x = argmin j∈B x j and argmax B x = argmax j∈B x j .
VALUE ITERATION

If x ∈
Definition 5.1 (Value Iteration Operator) . The value iteration operator T : R n → R n is defined as follows:
The operator T is a contraction with Lipschitz constant γ .
PROOF. Assume at first that i ∈ S 1 and that
The last inequality follows from the fact that the elements in P b are nonnegative and sum-up to 1. The three remaining cases, where i ∈ S 2 or (T u) i ≤ (T v) i are analogous.
Banach fixed point theorem now implies that the value iteration operator T has a unique fixed point. COROLLARY 5.3. There is a unique vector v * ∈ R n such that T v * = v * .
We next define the strategy extraction operators that play an important role in this section, and the central role in the next section.
Definition 5.4 (Strategy Extraction Operators). The strategy extraction operators P 1 : R n → 1 and P 2 : R n → 2 and P : R n → are defined as follows:
and Pv = (P 1 v, P 2 v) .
The following relation between the value iteration and strategy extraction operator is immediate.
LEMMA 5.5. For every v ∈ R n , we have T v = (c + γ Pv) π , where π = Pv.
The following simple lemma provides an interesting relation between the strategy extraction operator and reduced cost vectors.
LEMMA 5.6. For every strategy profile π , we have
The following lemma supplies a simple proof of Theorem 2.7. (This is, in fact, the original proof given by Shapley [1953] .) LEMMA 5.7. Let v * ∈ R n be the unique fixed point of T and let π = Pv * . Then, π is an optimal strategy profile.
PROOF. By Lemma 5.5, we get that v * = T v * = c π + γ P π v * . By Lemma 3.2, we get v π = v * . We next show that π satisfies the optimality condition of Lemma 3.7, and hence is an optimal strategy profile. Suppose that i ∈ S 1 and that a ∈ A i . By Lemma 5.6, we have π(i) = (P 1 v * )(i) = argmin A ic π . As (c π ) π(i) = 0, we get that (c π ) a ≥ 0. Similarly, if i ∈ S 2 and a ∈ A i , we get that (c π ) a ≤ 0.
The value iteration algorithm, given at the top of Figure 1 , repeatedly applies the value iteration operator T to an initial vector u 0 ∈ R n , generating a sequence of vectors (u k ) N k=0 , where u k+1 = T u k , until the difference between two successive vectors is sufficiently small, that is, u k−1 − u k ∞ < .
LEMMA 5.8. Let (u k ) N k=0 be the sequence of value vectors generated by a call VALUE-ITERATION(u 0 , ), for some > 0. Let v * be the optimal value vector. Then, for every 0 ≤ k ≤ N, we have
PROOF. By Lemma 5.2 and the fact that T v * = v * , we have
The claim follows easily by induction.
It follows immediately from Lemma 5.8, that for any u ∈ R n , the infinite sequence of vectors generated by the call VALUE-ITERATION(u 0 , 0) converges to the optimal value vector v * . Also, for every > 0, the call VALUE-ITERATION(u 0 , ) eventually terminates.
STRATEGY ITERATION
The strategy iteration algorithm is given at the bottom of Figure 1 . It was first described for the MDP case by Howard [1960] and is called policy iteration or Howard's algorithm in that context. It was described for 2-player stochastic games by Rao et al. [1973] . (Their algorithm actually works on more general imperfect information games for which it is a non-terminating approximation algorithm.)
The strategy iteration algorithm receives an initial strategy σ 0 of player 1, and generates a sequence π k = (σ k , τ k ) of strategy profiles of the two players, ending with an optimal strategy profile. Each iteration of the algorithm receives a strategy σ k and produces an improved strategy σ k+1 as follows. The algorithm first computes an optimal counter-strategy τ k = τ 2 (σ k ) for player 2 against σ k . (For a fixed discount factor this can be done in strongly polynomial time. One way of doing it is to apply the strategy iteration algorithm on the 1-player game obtained by forcing player 1 to use σ k .) Next, it evaluates the strategy profile π k = (σ k , τ k ), by solving a system of linear equations, and obtains its value vector v k = v π k . It then lets σ k+1 = P 1 v π k . Ties are broken, if possible, in favor of actions that are in σ k . (This is important, as termination is not guaranteed without this provision.) The algorithm terminates when two consecutive strategies σ k and σ k+1 are identical.
The step σ k+1 = P 1 v π k is the main step of the strategy iteration algorithm. As we shall (implicitly) see in this section, σ k+1 is obtained from σ k by performing a collection of improving switches. An action a ∈ A i , where i ∈ S 1 , is an improving switch with respect to a strategy profile π = (σ , τ ) if and only if (c π ) a < 0. For a collection I ⊆ A 1 of improving switches, all belonging to different states, we let σ [ I] be the unique strategy of player 1 satisfying I ⊆ σ [ I] ⊆ σ ∪ I. Then, σ [ I] is the strategy obtained from σ by simultaneously performing all the improving switches of I.
To prove the correctness of the STRATEGY-ITERATION algorithm we use the following lemma. (Note that π 1 in the lemma is obtained from π 0 using one iteration of the STRATEGY-ITERATION algorithm.) LEMMA 6.1. Let σ 0 ∈ 1 , π 0 = (σ 0 , τ 2 (σ 0 )) and σ 1 = P 1 v π 0 , π 1 = (σ 1 , τ 2 (σ 1 )).
PROOF. We first show that (c π 0 ) π 1 ≤ 0. Let π 1 = (σ 1 , τ 1 ), where τ 1 = τ 2 (σ 1 ). Indeed, (c π 0 ) σ 1 ≤ 0 follows from the fact that for every i ∈ S 1 we have σ 1 (i) = argmin A ic π 0 and hence (c π 0 ) σ 1 (i) ≤ (c π 0 ) σ 0 (i) = 0. (The fact that (c π 0 ) σ 0 (i) = 0 follows from Lemma 3.4.) As τ 0 = τ 2 (σ 0 ) is an optimal counter-strategy against σ 0 , we get by Lemma 3.6 that (c π 0 ) A 2 ≤ 0 and hence (c π 0 ) τ 1 ≤ 0. Thus, (c π 0 ) π 1 ≤ 0. By Lemmas 3.1 and 3.5, we thus have
Finally, if (c π 0 ) A 1 ≥ 0, then we have (c π 0 ) π 1 < 0 and hence v π 1 − v π 0 < 0.
LEMMA 6.2. For every initial strategy σ 0 , STRATEGY-ITERATION(σ 0 ) terminates after a finite number of iterations. If (v k ) N k=0 is the sequence of value vectors generated by the call, then, v k−1 > v k ≥ v * , for every 1 ≤ k < N. Furthermore, v N−1 = v N = v * and π N−1 = π N is an optimal strategy profile.
PROOF. The claim v k−1 ≥ v k , for every 1 ≤ k ≤ N follows easily from Lemma 6.1 by induction. If v k−1 = v k , for some k, then by Lemma 6.1, we must have (c π k−1 ) A 1 ≥ 0. As τ k−1 is an optimal counter-strategy against σ k−1 , we get by Lemma 3.6 that (c π k−1 ) A 2 ≤ 0. By the optimality condition (Lemma 3.7), we get that π k−1 is an optimal strategy profile. By the tie-breaking mechanism used, we also get that π k = π k−1 . Finally, the fact that v k−1 > v k , for every 1 ≤ k < N, implies that strategy profiles encountered cannot repeat themselves. As there is only a finite number of such profiles, the sequence of strategy profiles generated must be finite.
We next relate the sequences of value vectors obtained by running STRATEGY-ITERATION(σ 0 ) and VALUE-ITERATION(v π 0 , ), where π 0 = (σ 0 , τ 2 (σ 0 )). The following lemmas for the case of MDPs are well-known and appear, for example, in Meister and Holzbaur [1986] . The proofs for the 2-player case are essentially identical. (They may be folklore.) LEMMA 6.3. Let σ 0 ∈ 1 , π 0 = (σ 0 , τ 2 (σ 0 )), and σ 1 = P 1 v π 0 , π 1 = (σ 1 , τ 2 (σ 1 )).
PROOF. Let i ∈ S 1 . As σ 1 (i) = argmin A i c + γ Pv π 0 , v π 0 ≥ v π 1 , and c π 1 + γ P π 1 v π 1 = v π 1 , we have
Using Lemma 6.3, we immediately get: LEMMA 6.4. Let (v k ) N k=0 be the value vectors generated by STRATEGY-ITERATION (σ 0 ), and let (u k ) ∞ k=0 be the value vectors generated by VALUE-ITERATION(v π 0 , 0), where π 0 = (σ 0 , τ 2 (σ 0 )). Then, v k ≤ u k , for every 0 ≤ k ≤ N.
PROOF. Let (π k ) N k=0 , where π k = (σ k , τ k ), be the sequence of strategy profiles generated by the strategy iteration algorithm. By the correctness of the strategy iteration algorithm, π * = π N is composed of optimal strategies for the two players. Let a = argmax π kc π * . By Lemma 3.7, we have (c π * ) a ≥ 0 for every a ∈ A 1 , and (c π * ) a ≤ 0 for every a ∈ A 2 . We may assume, therefore, that a ∈ A 1 , that is, that a is an action controlled by player 1. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that a ∈ π , for some k + L < ≤ N. Using Lemma 7.3, with π = π k , π = π and π = π * , we get that
On the other hand, using Lemma 6.5, we get that v π − v π * ∞ ≤ γ −k v π k − v π * ∞ . Combining the two inequalities, we get
THEOREM 7.5. The STRATEGY-ITERATION algorithm, starting from any initial strategy, terminates with an optimal strategy after at most (m + 1)(1 + log 1/γ n 1−γ ) = O( m 1−γ log n 1−γ ) iterations.
PROOF. LetL = 1+log 1/γ n 1−γ . Consider strategies σ 0 , σL, σ 2L , . . .. By Lemma 7.4, every strategy in this subsequence contains a new action that would never be used again. As there are only m actions, the total number of strategies in the sequence is at most (m + 1)L = (m + 1)(1 + log 1/γ n 1−γ ). Finally, note that log 1/γ x = log x log 1/γ ≤ log x 1−γ .
Theorem 7.5 states that MDPs and 2TBSGs can be solved by performing O( m 1−γ log n 1−γ ) policy/strategy improvement iterations. In the case of MDPs, each policy iteration can be performed in O(mn + M(n)) time, where M(n) is the time needed to solve a system of n linear equations in n variables. (This time can be improved if the actions of the MDP have special structure.) In the case of 2TBSGs, each strategy iteration requires the solution of an MDP. The total number of arithmetical operations required to solve a 2TBSG is thus at most O((mn + M(n))( m 1−γ log n 1−γ ) 2 ).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have shown that the strategy iteration algorithm is strongly polynomial for 2TB-SGs with a fixed discount factor. Friedmann [2011] , on the other hand, has recently shown that the strategy iteration algorithm is exponential for nondiscounted 2TBSG, or when the discount factor is part of the input. The existence of polynomial-time algorithms for 2TBSGs when the discount factor is part of the input, or for the nondiscounted case, remains an intriguing and a challenging open problem, with many possible consequences for complexity theory and automatic verification. As shown by Andersson and Miltersen [2009] , this is equivalent to finding a polynomial-time algorithm for Condon's [1992] Simple Stochastic Games (SSGs). Such an algorithm will immediately provide polynomial-time algorithms for Mean Payoff Games (MPGs) (see Ehrenfeucht and Mycielski [1979] , Gurvich et al. [1988] , Zwick and Paterson [1996] ) and Parity Games (PGs) (see, e.g., Emerson and Jutla [1991] , Vöge and Jurdziński [2000] , and ).
